

EXHIBIT

***** (1) German Contact Established: As Colonel Eugen Ott rose to Major General and from Assistant Military attache to military attache and finally to ambassador, Sorge's access to the best German information in Japan became established. Ott found Sorge's information and advice invaluable and needless to say the 4th Bureau in Moscow, through Sorge, found Ott's information even more invaluable. With the passage of years Ott came to show his official documents quite freely to Sorge, to exchange views and to keep him informed. Similarly, the Military Attache, the Air Attache, the Naval Attache and the Gestapo chief attached to the Embassy from 1940, Colonel Joseph Meissinger, came to trust and rely on Dr. Richard Sorge. Only the Naval Attache seems to have doubted him, and not on any suspicion of Soviet loyalties but because he didn't like him. Naturally, it took many years for Sorge to arrive at this incredible position of trust at the German Embassy, but by 1939 he had covered the full route. After the outbreak of the European war Ott designated Sorge as press attache of the embassy, putting him on the German payroll, and giving him the strength of official position. Most mornings after Sorge had pounded out the press releases on the progress of the war in Europe, he joined the ambassador over late breakfast. Sorge had much to give the ambassador in the way of Japanese gossip and fact, and in turn the ambassador had much to tell Sorge. He showed Sorge the instructions from home and his proposed replies. Having the ambassador's example, he did the other chief members of the mission, the officer closest to Dr. Richard Sorge, Soviet Spy, being none other than Colonel Meissinger of the Gestapo. On occasion Sorge memorized the essentials of these documents and conversations, and sometimes he recorded the documents with his ever present camera. Like de Voukelitch he was an incorrigible amateur camera enthusiast.

After 1939, with his office at the German Embassy, and in effect a part of that embassy's intelligence organization, Sorge's position was perfect for learning everything about Japan, its capacities and intentions, that was known to Japan's ally, Germany. There was much unknown to the German allies, however, and this information Sorge had to gather in other ways. After the signing of the Tripartite Pact on 27 September 1940, however, the Japanese Army and Navy General Staff discussed their problems far more freely with appropriate members of the German Embassy.

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Defense Document 1085

These embassy officers frankly asked Sorge for his opinions. Indeed, Sorge had been a primary architect of that Axis Pact. General Ott had felt so indebted to Sorge for his work in the development of the Tripartite Pact that he intended to have Sorge present at the official signing in Tokyo. Hitler's special representative, Dr. Heinrich Stahmer, who had come over from China to complete the treaty, however, objected, and Sorge was not present. Stahmer had no suspicion of Sorge's integrity. At most he must have been jealous of sharing credit with a relatively unknown and minor figure. There is nothing more ironical in the history of the Sorge ring, however, than Sorge's part in bringing on the Tripartite Pact which inevitably hastened the war and Ozaki Hozumi's part, related later, in establishing the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

(pages 24-25)

Defense Document 3086

*****Ott was out of sympathy with the Nazi program, but he went along with the orders from his government. He had only arrived in Japan in 1933, being transferred out of Germany by higher ranking officers who feared for his safety in the Nazi purges then under way. Whatever Ott knew or thought about Germany he knew almost nothing about Japan, and he was delighted to find in his new friends Richard an extraordinary fund of information on things Japanese, and on Japanese politics and trends, as well as sage advice. When Ott made his next grade and was stationed in Tokyo his friendship with Sorge deepened and their meetings came to be more and more frequent*****

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明治文庫三〇八六 第三
一 岡田の参府立

オイゲン、オット大佐は少将に昇り次席陸軍武官より陸軍武官、終に大佐となるに従つてゾルデの日本に於ける最幸岡田参府立の地位が確立された。オットはゾルデの情報と動向を重要視し、ゾルデを組むのモスコウ参府局も勿論オットの情報を一層重要視したのである。年月の経るに従ひ、オットは意見を交換し情報を得て行くため初めて自由に公文書をゾルデに示すに至つた

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D. D 3086

ゾルゲは日本側ゴシップと真相の方面に於て大使に傳へる所は多くあり、それに應じて大使もゾルゲに語る事は多量に持合せた。彼はゾルゲに本國よりの指令と彼の回答腹案を示した。大使の側に働つて大使館の他の主要な人々と取入り。ソソヴェートのスパイ、リハルド・ゾルゲ博士に最も親密な官吏はゲスタポのマイシンガー大佐其人であつた。ゾルゲは此等文書と會談の要旨を暗記した。また時にはその身證を放さなかつたカメラを以てそれら文書を撮影した。ゾルゲはデ・ヴィケリツチの如く彼も素人撮影狂であつた。

昭和十四年以後、ドイツ大使館に事務所を持ち、事實上ドイツ大使館情報部
の一部となつた。ゾルゲの位置は、當時日本の同盟國であつたドイツに於て知
り得る限りの日本に關する情報、特に日本の能力と意圖の如きものは、臭ぎ
出さるゝに最も完全なるものであつた。併し同盟國ドイツにも分らない事が澤山
あつた。ゾルゲはこれらの情報は他の方法で入手しなければならなかつた。
并し昭和十五年九月二十七日に三國同盟が成立して以後は、日本の陸海軍の
主腦部は、ドイツ大使館の適當な館員とらつと自由に種々の問題を討議する
やうになつた。

辯護文書三〇八六

此年大使館員達は率直にソージに意見を述べた。實にソーヂは三國同盟の主要なる計畫者であつた。オット將軍は三國盟を締結する迄にソージの努力を非常に多として居たので東京に於いて正式調印の時ソージに出席させる積りで居た。然し同條約を完成する爲又亦から來たヒットラーの特別使者ハインリッヒ・スターマー博士が反對した爲にソーヂは出席しなかつた。スターマーはソージの誠實なる事を臺も疑はなかつた。精々比較的無名で重要でない人物と功を共にすることに嫉妬心を起した位に過ぎない。然しソーヂの歴史に於いて今次戦争を必然的に早めた三國同盟を締結させたソールジの役割と後日大政翼賛會を締成する上に關係した尾崎秀實の役割は皮肉なものである。

Def. Don 3086

………オットーはナチ政府の計畫には共鳴しなかつたが、并し
る所の司令に於いて行動して行つた。……昭和八年に日本に赴きし
たのであり、それは、當時行はれてゐたナチ政府の「正の中」にあつ
て彼の安全を氣づかつた、彼の上級達がドイツ国外に彼をのがれさ
す手段としてであつた。

0.0. 3086

オットーがドイツに歸し、如何なる事を知り、また如何なる事を考へてゐたにせよ、彼は日本に歸いては死んだ何の豫備知識も持つてゐなかつた。而して彼の新しい知己リトアルトゾルゲから日本に歸し、奥書を知識を與へられ、日本の政治や一般の趣向に關し、オットーが昇進し、駐日ドイツ大使とを助言を與へられることを喜んだ、オットーが昇進し、駐日ドイツ大使とみづたは彼とゾルゲとの交際の益々親密となり二人は一層度々會合するやうになつた。